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Hack The Box: Administrator Walkthrough Medium Difficulty

Chained privilege escalation on an AD environment via misconfigured permissions — no CVEs, just clever abuse of default rights. From Olivia to Emily to Ethan, we pivoted through user relationships using BloodHound, CrackMapExec, Kerberoasting, and WinRM access. Highlighting how overlooked configurations can lead to full domain compromise.

#ActiveDirectory #PrivilegeEscalation #BloodHound #Kerberoasting #HackTheBox #RedTeam #CyberSecurity #WindowsPentest

Hack The Box: Ghost Machine Walkthrough – Insane Difficulty

The initial foothold was gained by exploiting command injection on intranet.ghost.htb:8008/api-dev/scan/, which provided a reverse shell inside a Docker container. From there, I enumerated the environment and discovered credentials that allowed SSH access as Florence Ramirez. By extracting and converting a Kerberos ticket, I authenticated as a legitimate user, escalating access within the system. With access to the Windows environment, I retrieved NTLM hashes for the adfs_gmsa account and leveraged evil-winrm for lateral movement. A reverse shell was established using JokerShell, and privileges were escalated by enabling xp_cmdshell through a debug interface. After uploading EfsPotato.cs and disabling antivirus, I used Mimikatz and Rubeus.exe to dump credentials, ultimately achieving SYSTEM access. This led to the extraction of domain admin credentials and the retrieval of the root flag. Another Insane box down! 💀💻

#HackTheBox #RedTeam #CyberSecurity #PenTesting #PrivilegeEscalation #EthicalHacking

Hack The Box: Certified Machine Walkthrough – Medium Difficulty

Access is gained using Judith Mader’s credentials, allowing enumeration of network resources. CrackMapExec identifies key accounts like management_svc and ca_operator. Privilege escalation is performed using a Shadow Credentials attack with Certipy, taking control of management_svc. With valid credentials, Evil-WinRM establishes a remote session, leading to the user flag.

For root access, the attack exploits Active Directory Certificate Services by modifying ca_operator’s User Principal Name (UPN) to Administrator, enabling a privileged certificate request. A vulnerable ESC9 certificate is issued without linking back to ca_operator, effectively granting Administrator access. The UPN is restored to avoid detection, and authentication via Kerberos retrieves the NT hash of the Administrator account. Full system control is confirmed by obtaining the root flag.

#HackTheBox #Pentesting #ActiveDirectory #PrivilegeEscalation #CyberSecurity #EthicalHacking